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I. INTRODUCTION1 
United States District Court Judge Henry Kennedy issued an or-
der to the government in June 2005 mandating that “all evidence and 
information regarding the torture, mistreatment, and abuse of detai-
nees now at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay” be 
preserved.
2
  Other United States district court judges issued similar 
 
 * Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, and Director, Seton Hall Uni-
versity School of Law Center for Policy and Research.  The Report also benefited 
from the research and contributions of Grace Byrd, Jillian Camarote, Douglas Eadie, 
Shana Edwards, Christopher Fox, John Gregorek, Gabrielle Hughes, Daniel Lorenzo, 
Daniel Mann, Mark Muoio, Michael Patterson, Courtney Ray, Megan Sassaman, He-
len Skinner, and Lauren Winchester.   
 ** Partner, Denbeaux & Denbeaux.  Co-authors Professors Mark Denbeaux and 
Joshua Denbeaux represent two Guantánamo detainees. 
 1 This Report was originally published on February 7, 2008, and has not been 
updated with any subsequent government document releases or Wikileaks informa-
tion.  For future reports by the Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Policy 
and Research (the “Center”), visit the Center’s website 
at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/Guantan
amo-Reports.cfm. 
 2 Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17189, at *5 (D.D.C. June 
10, 2005) (order granting injunction to preserve and maintain evidence regarding 
the treatment of detainees at Guantánamo Bay); see also Context of June–July 2005: 
Judges Order Bush Administration Not to Destroy Evidence of Torture and Abuse of Detainees, 
HIST. COMMONS,  http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0605kennedy 
kessler#a0605kennedykessler (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).   
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orders as early as March 2005.
3
  In November 2005, however, Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials destroyed at least two videotapes 
documenting the interrogations of two Guantánamo detainees.
4
  The 
destruction of these two tapes occurred not only after the orders were 
issued, but also after the United States Supreme Court ruled that in-
dividuals detained at Guantánamo could pursue habeas corpus ac-
tions.
5
  Attempting to ward off judicial inquiry into the destruction of 
the tapes, the government argued that inquiry by the courts would 
compromise the Justice Department’s investigation of the matter.
6
  
On January 24, 2008, however, United States District Court Judge Ri-
chard W. Roberts issued an order which became the first to require 
that the government provide information regarding the tapes’ de-
struction.
7
 
Judge Roberts’s order did not, however, require the government 
to provide any information regarding tapes other than the two tapes 
that the government admitted destroying.  Indeed, while judicial in-
quiry into the destruction of these two tapes is under way, there has 
not yet been any inquiry by the courts into the existence or destruc-
tion of other tapes documenting interrogations conducted at Guan-
tánamo by the CIA.  The courts have also not yet inquired about the 
existence or destruction of taped interrogations conducted by entities 
other than the CIA that interrogated detainees at Guantánamo. 
This Report reveals the following: 
 A report issued by a lieutenant general of the United 
States army indicates that more than 24,000 interroga-
tions were conducted at Guantánamo between 2002 and 
2008.8 
 A second report, produced almost simultaneously by the 
surgeon general of the United States Army, reveals that 
 
 3 See Abdullah v. Bush, 534 F. Supp. 2d 22, 22–23 (D.D.C.), vacated in part, 534 F. 
Supp. 2d (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2008) (“[A] preservation order that required respondents 
to ‘preserve and maintain all evidence, documents and information, without limita-
tion, now or ever in respondents’ possession, custody or control, regarding the indi-
vidual detained petitioner[] in th[is] case[].’” (second, third, and forth alterations in 
original)).  
 4 Scott Shane, Court Inquiry on Tape Case is Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at 8.  
 5 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 6 Shane, supra note 4. 
 7 Abdullah, 534 F. Supp. at 22–23; see also Scott Shane, Judge Demands a Report on 
Destroyed C.I.A. Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, at A19.   
 8  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ARMY REGULATION 15-6: FINAL REPORT: INVESTIGATION INTO 
FBI ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY 
6 (2005), available at http://www.dod.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf. 
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all interrogations conducted at Guantánamo were video-
taped.9  Thus, many videotapes documenting Guantána-
mo interrogations do or did exist. 
 An infrastructure for videotaping exists at Guantánamo.10 
 The CIA is just one of many entities that interrogated de-
tainees in Guantánamo.11 
 Each of these entities has identical motives to destroy 
taped investigations as did the CIA, and each can apply 
an identical justification to the destruction of tapes: the 
entity’s interest in “protecting” the interrogators.  Any 
videotapes that may still exist are vulnerable to destruc-
tion if they have not already been destroyed.12 
 Because the government keeps detailed logs of interroga-
tions, it is readily ascertainable which videotapes still exist 
and which tapes have been destroyed.13  Such an inquiry 
is crucial to the evaluation—as required by Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal procedures, the Military Commis-
sion Act, and the Detainee Treatment Act—of the relia-
bility of hearsay evidence against a detainee.14 
II. MANY VIDEOTAPES DOCUMENTING GUANTÁNAMO INTERROGATION 
DO OR DID EXIST 
On May 24, 2005, Lieutenant General Kevin C. Kiley, M.D.—the 
surgeon general of the United States Army—issued a report review-
ing medical policies at Guantánamo Bay, Operation Enduring Free-
dom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
15
  The report was created be-
cause of “concerns regarding the appropriate treatment of detainees, 
including during interrogation and access to medical care.”
16
  Specifi-
cally, the report examined “whether detainee medical records were 
properly maintained; whether medical personnel were aware of de-
tainee abuse and failed to report abuse; and to determine whether 
 
 9  OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. ARMY, FINAL REPORT: ASSESSMENT OF 
DETAINEE MEDICAL OPERATIONS FOR OEF, GTMO, AND OIF § 18-2(d) (2005), available 
at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Army%20Surgeon%20General%2
0Report.pdf. 
 10  See supra Part III. 
 11  See supra Part IV. 
 12  See supra Part V. 
 13  See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 14  See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 15  OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. ARMY, supra note 9. 
 16 See id. § 2-1(a).  
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medical personnel received and/or are currently receiving appropri-
ate training so that they are fully prepared to perform the mission of 
caring for detainees.”
17
 
As the surgeon general’s report acknowledged, the “revelations 
of detainee abuse in the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility in Iraq. . . . 
[and] reports in the press [that] have alleged wrongdoing by military 
medical personnel” created an increased awareness of the military’s 
interrogation procedures.
18
  Indeed, the New England Journal of Medi-
cine reported concerns regarding military doctors’ treatment of pris-
oners.
19
  And in 2004, the American Medical Association “sup-
port[ed] calls for a new investigation into whether doctors were 
complicit in the torture of prisoners held by U.S. military forces in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.”
20
 
Lieutenant General Kiley’s report arose out of the medical 
community’s concerns and was released in May 2005.  Chapter 18 of 
the report contains a section labeled “Overview of Site Visits to Afg-
hanistan (OEF), Cuba (GTMO), and Iraq (OIF)”; Subsection 18-2 
addresses specifically the site visits to Guantánamo Bay.
21
  Within Sec-
tion 18-2, the report notes that “[m]edics randomly observe interro-
gations and have the ability to halt an interrogation at any point they 
deem necessary.”
22
  The same section of the report assures that: “[a]ll 
interrogations are videotaped.”
23
 
On June 9, 2005, within weeks of the release of Lieutenant Gen-
eral Kiley’s report, Lieutenant General Randall Schmidt produced an 
amended report which reviewed FBI allegations of detainee abuse at 
Guantánamo Bay.
24
  According to Lieutenant General Schmidt’s re-
port, more than 24,000 interrogations had been completed at Guan-
tánamo Bay since 2002.
25
  Together, these two reports—which were 
released almost simultaneously—indicate that the government con-
ducted and videotaped more than 24,000 interrogations at Guantá-
namo Bay. 
 
 17 Id. § 2-1(d). 
 18 Id. § 2-1(a). 
 19 Robert Jay Lifton, Doctors and Torture, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 415, 415–16 (2004), 
available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/351/5/415. 
 20 Susan Mayor, AMA Calls for Inquiry Into Doctors’ Role in Abuse of Prisoners’, 329 
BRIT. MED. J. 993, 993 (2004), available at 
http://www.bmj.com/content/329/7473/993.1.full. 
 21 OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. ARMY, supra note 9, § 18-1. 
 22 Id. § 18-2(d). 
 23 Id. (emphasis added). 
 24 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8. 
 25 Id. at 6. 
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III. VIDEOTAPING INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLICIES 
Records indicate that an infrastructure for videotaping exists at 
Guantánamo.  Cameras are positioned in every interrogation room, 
and each room is monitored from elsewhere, as illustrated by the fol-
lowing: 
[REDACTED] and I were in monitoring room 5 in gold building 
observing the approach of [REDACTED] a fellow interrogator. 
[REDACTED] was interrogating in interrogation room 4.  Moni-
toring room 5 overlooks both interrogation room 4 and interro-
gation room 6.
26
 
Many other documents reference the Closed Circuit Television 
(CCTV) system at Guantánamo Bay.  As just one more example, a 
special agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) docu-
mented the following: 
Got called out the other night for [REDACTED].  He called the 
guards and said he wanted to talk to somebody now.  We watched 
him groom himself and prayer-up for his “meeting.”  [An Agent, 
REDACTED] and a linguist went over and E & I watched on the vid-
eo monitor. . . .We continue to review the files, consult with the 
teams and continue the work at Delta.
27
 
In fact, the Defense Department’s “Standard Operating Proce-
dures for Guantánamo’s Camp Delta” mandated that “monitors will 
observe all interrogations” and that monitors “will be located either 
in a monitor room that is equipped with two way mirrors and CCTV 
or in a CCTV only room.”
28
  Thus, an infrastructure for taping exists 
at Guantánamo. 
Additionally, agencies that interrogated detainees at Guantána-
mo have policies encouraging, if not requiring, videotaping of inter-
rogations.  The policy of the Department of Defense’s Criminal Inves-
tigation Task Force (CITF), for instance, notes the department’s 
strong preference for videotaping final interviews with detainees who 
are being transferred and who are potential witnesses.
29
  Exceptions 
 
 26 Memorandum from [REDACTED], to [REDACTED](Apr. 28, 
2003)(alterations in original)(on file with author). 
 27 E-mail from [REDACTED], to [REDACTED] (Aug. 28, 2002, 12:23 
PM)(alterations in original)(on file with author). 
 28 JOINT TASK FORCE-GUANTÁNAMO, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CAMP DELTA STANDARD 
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) § 14-12 (2003), available at 
http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/gitmo-sop.pdf.  
 29 Memorandum from Brittain P. Mallow, Colonel, U.S. Army, for All Assigned to 
the DOD Criminal Investigation Task Force to Task Force Commander,  (Oct. 3, 
2003), available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/64362/01024display.pdf.  
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to this policy, in fact, require special approval.
30
  This policy is stated 
in a document identified as the “CITF Memorandum for All Person-
nel Assigned to the DoD Criminal Investigation Task Force” dated 
October 3, 2003, and signed by Brittain P. Mallow, Colonel Military 
Police: 
2. (U) The purpose of this memorandum is to reiterate my pre-
vious guidance to Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) per-
sonnel, related to the conduct of interrogations of detainees or 
persons under custody.  For the purpose of this memorandum all 
references to detainees will also apply to persons under custody. 
. . . . 
4. Interrogation: 
f. (U) Photographs and or video recordings of interrogations are 
not required as a matter of policy; however, they may be generat-
ed at the discretion of the agent conducting the interview with the 
concurrence of the RAC [““Resident Agent in Charge”“].  CITF 
personnel may consider videotaping the final interview with de-
tainees who are to be released/transferred and will strongly consid-
er videotaping a final interview of any detainee who is being transferred 
who has possible value as a witness.  Exceptions to this policy must be ap-
proved by CITF-HQ at the Commander (CDR) or Deputy Com-
mander (DCO) level.  The DCO is also the Senior Agent in 
Charge (SAC).
31
 
Thus, the videotaping of interrogations was clearly authorized by 
the CITF, and in some very important cases (that is, when a trans-
ferred detainee was perceived as a potential witness), disallowed only 
with permission. 
There were, of course, many different agencies with their own 
procedures and policies with regard to videotaping.  As an example 
of another agency’s policies, the Army Field Manual for Human Intel-
ligence Collection Operations (HUMINT)
32
 states HUMINT’s prefe-
rence for videotaping as a means of recording interrogations: 
Video recording is possibly the most accurate method of record-
ing a questioning session since it records not only the voices but 
also can be examined for details of body language and source and 
collector interaction.
33
 
 
 30 Id. at 1. 
 31 Id. at 1–2(emphasis added). 
 32 HUMINT was one of multiple agencies that interrogated detainees at Guantá-
namo.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 33  U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS 9-11 
(2006), available at 
http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/FM%202-
22.3%20%20Human%20Intelligence%20Collector%20Operations_1.pdf.  
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Interestingly, the two potential drawbacks of videotaping—that 
filming requires equipment, and that cameras might inhibit a 
source—do not apply to Guantánamo because (a) the detainees were 
already being “monitored” by cameras, and (b) the detainees already 
believed that they were being filmed.  One agent for the FBI, for in-
stance, reported the following: 
During a prior interview (FD-302 dated 10/26/2002) 
[REDACTED] made the comment: “I got out of the circle and 
now I am in chains.”  He was asked about the meaning of the 
comment.  He said he did not remember the reason he said it and 
asked to be told what the comment was in relation to.  When told 
that it concerned [REDACTED and REDACTED, REDACTED] 
became defensive and stared at the ground.  He told the inter-
viewers to “check the tapes,” referring to his belief that all interviews are 
videotaped.
34
 
Thus, the policies as well as the infrastructure in place at Guantána-
mo support the videotaping of interrogations. 
IV. THE CIA IS JUST ONE OF MANY INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING 
AGENCIES TO HAVE INTERROGATED DETAINEES ON CAMERA 
The following federal agencies or bureaus conducted interroga-
tions at Guantánamo: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its 
Counterterrorism Center (CITF), the FBI, the Behavioral Analysis 
Unit of the FBI (BAU), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the 
HUMINT, the Army Criminal Investigative Division (ACID), the Air 
Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), and the Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS).
35
  In addition, private contractors inter-
rogated detainees.
36
  As just one example of the number of entities 
engaged in interrogations of Guantánamo detainees, the following is 
excerpted from an incident report filed on April 26, 2003, by an ana-
lyst for a private contractor hired by the Defense Department, in 
which the analyst reported abuse of a prisoner—not by a CIA agent, 
but by U.S. Army and Navy analysts—in a video-monitored interroga-
tion room: 
 
 34 E-mail from [REDACTED], to [REDACTED] ([REDACTED])(alterations in 
original)(on file with author). 
 35 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DETAINEES POSITIVE RESPONSES 69–73, 176, 214 
(2004), available at 
http://vault.fbi.gov/Guantanamo%20/Guantanamo%20Part%201%20of%201/view 
 36 See Griff Witte & Renee Merle, Contractors Are Cited in Abuses at Guantánamo, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2007, at D1.  The first private contractor hired to interrogate de-
tainees was Affiliated Computer Systems (ACS).  Id.  ACS was later replaced by Che-
nega.  Id. 
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When we walked into a monitoring room, we saw another inter-
rogation in room 7 was going on.  In the monitoring room was a 
female Army analyst and a male Navy analyst.  The Army analyst 
was controlling the monitor and had a speaker so that both par-
ties could hear the interrogation.  The speaker was loud enough 
that I could hear it muffled even though I had headsets on.  In 
the interrogation room was the interrogator [REDACTED], a 
male Navy interpreter, two male MPs and the detainee.
37
  
This Guantánamo Bay interrogation was conducted not by the CIA, 
but by the Army and the Navy, and was reported by a private contrac-
tor for the Department of Defense who was also an interrogator. 
Additionally, on September 14, 2004, an FBI agent from the 
Counterterrorism Division issued a report to FBI headquarters in re-
sponse to a query as to whether he had witnessed any abuse toward 
prisoners during interrogations.  In his response, the agent described 
incidents involving the ACID, OSI, and the NCIS, all of which, he in-
dicated, were involved in interrogations at Guantánamo.
38
  In the 
same report, the FBI agent indicated that the employees of the NCIS 
checked with the NCIS’s attorneys to determine whether harsh or ag-
gressive interrogation techniques were permitted to be used on the 
prisoners.
39
  While the agent was unclear as to whether he witnessed 
the NCIS employees engage in abuse, the agent stated in the report 
that harsh techniques were used by DIA/DHS.
40
 
Notwithstanding the diverse entities involved in interrogation at 
Guantánamo, the government has not acknowledged that the De-
partment of Defense, the FBI, or any entity other than the CIA taped 
interrogations of detainees.  Tapes produced by any of these other 
entities—and indeed, tapes produced anywhere at Guantánamo—do 
not fall within the scope of the Justice Department’s narrow investiga-
tion into the matter of the two videotapes destroyed by the CIA. 
 
 37 Letter from T.J. Harrington, Deputy Assistant Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investiga-
tion, to [REDACTED] (Nov. 4, 2004)[hereinafter Harrington Letter], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/pdf/DOJFBI002181.pdf; see also Let-
ter from T.J. Harrington, Deputy Assistant Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Do-
nald J. Ryder, Major Gen., U.S. Army (July 14, 2004)[hereinafter Ryder Letter], 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/pdf/DOJFBI001914.pdf. 
 38 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 35, at 70. 
 39 Id. at 214. 
 40 Id. at 69–70, 214.  “DHS” stands for Defense HUMINT Services. 
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V. ANY VIDEOTAPES THAT STILL EXIST ARE VULNERABLE TO 
DESTRUCTION IF THEY HAVE NOT ALREADY BEEN DESTROYED 
The fact that the government has not provided any videotaped 
interrogations for evaluation is unsurprising, given the content of 
some of the videotapes.  In fact, one interrogator, aware that her in-
terrogation of a detainee was on camera, attempted to shield her ac-
tions from view: 
She directed a marine to duct tape a curtain over the two-way mir-
ror between the interrogation room and the observation 
room. . . .Through the surveillance monitor, [Special Agent, 
REDACTED] then observed [REDACTED] position herself be-
tween the detainee and the surveillance camera.
41
 
One can only guess what interrogation techniques the agent was try-
ing to hide from the cameras. 
Leaving less to the imagination is the following record of anoth-
er interrogation, documented by an ex-military civilian contractor 
(and interrogator) for the Department of Defense: 
They [the detainee, the Navy interpreter, the interrogator, and 
the two military policemen] were all standing in the center of the 
floor.  The MPs held the detainee by the upper arms.  The inter-
preter was standing to the rear of the detainee and [REDACTED] 
was standing directly in front of the detainee.  [REDACTED] was 
yelling questions at the detainee very rapidly, [REDACTED] 
yelled “DOWN.”  The MPs then pushed the detainee to the floor with 
enough force to not only shake the camera in the interrogation room, but 
also in the room that [REDACTED] was conducting his interrogation.  
He would then yell “GET UP,” and the MPs would jerk the detai-
nee up.  Each time the female analyst first heard the word 
“DOWN” [REDACTED] the analyst in the monitoring room stood 
up to watch this as it was happening and was laughing about it.
42
 
Another report gave a similar description: 
[REDACTED] then shouted “DOWN” and the two detainee es-
corts pushed the detainee to the floor.  When I say pushed to the 
floor I mean they pushed in the back of the detainee’s knees with 
their knees, taking the detainee to his knees.  Then holding the 
detainee by his upper arms they slam  ed his upper body to the 
floor.  This series of motions was all done in one swift movement, 
so that the detainee went from a standing position to a prone po-
sition all at once.  The force with which the detainee’s body hit 
 
 41 Harrington Letter, supra note 37; see also Ryder Letter, supra note 37. 
 42 Memorandum from [REDACTED], Analyst, Amidon Contracting Solutions, 
Inc., to [REDACTED] (Apr. 22, 2003)(alterations in original) (emphasis added) (on 
file with author). 
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the floor was such that [REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, 
REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, 
REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED] was inter-
rogating.  Immediately before the detainee was pushed to the 
floor, [REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, 
REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED] and the 
Navy analyst were laughing about the treatment of the detai-
nee. . . .  The force with which the detainee hit the floor was, in 
my estimation, adequate to cause severe internal injury.  I left the 
monitoring room.
43
 
Clearly, descriptions of the physical trauma exacted upon the 
prisoner by Department of Defense officials were redacted not be-
cause of concern for national security, but rather because of concern 
for the department’s potential liability.  A natural corollary to that 
concern is an even greater desire to destroy any filmed evidence of 
whatever was redacted.  In the words of a former senior CIA official: 
“It’s a qualitatively different thing—seeing it versus reading about 
it.”
44
 
VI. THE GOVERNMENT KEPT METICULOUS RECORDS OF ALL 
INTERROGATIONS 
The name of each detainee, the identity of each interrogator, 
and the date, time, and place of each interrogation were meticulously 
recorded in logs.  One FBI special agent stated, in response to an FBI 
special inquiry, that, while he did not know the identity of a particu-
lar “bleeding detainee” or the personnel who interrogated the detai-
nee, the agent believed that: 
determining their identities would be possible by querying logs 
maintained by the military at GITMO.  According to SA 
[REDACTED], the date, interviewing room, and the identities of 
the interviewers and detainees for each interview were maintained 
by the military at GITMO.
45
 
Predictably, identifying details pertinent to the interrogations were 
logged in detail by the FBI and by the Department of Defense.  De-
partment of Defense employees could even request and obtain tran-
 
 43 Memorandum from [REDACTED], Interrogator, Amidon Contracting Solu-
tions, Inc., to [REDACTED] 1–2 (Apr. 26, 2003)(alterations in original) (emphasis 
added)(on file with author). 
 44 Kevin Whitelaw, The New CIA Acts a Bit Like the Old CIA, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Dec. 24, 2007), at 26, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2007/12/13/the-new-cia-acts-a-bit-like-the-
old-cia. 
 45 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 35, at 72. 
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scripts, reports and after-action interviews of any and all interviews 
conducted by other agencies and entities to determine the law en-
forcement value of the information and the effectiveness of the inter-
rogation strategies employed.
46
  Thus, to determine what was video-
taped and which tapes were destroyed would not be burdensome for 
the government. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal procedures,47 the Military 
Commission Act,48 and the Detainee Treatment Act49 all require that 
the reliability of the evidence against a detainee be evaluated.  The 
reliability of hearsay evidence, in particular, must be evaluated.
50
  The 
taped interrogations recorded at Guantánamo Bay are equally as im-
portant to evaluating the reliability of the evidence against a detainee 
as were the two videotapes destroyed by the CIA.  Judge Roberts’s or-
der represents an important shift from the court’s reliance upon the 
government’s self-investigation, but—like the investigation itself—it 
applies only narrowly.  Judicial and perhaps congressional inquiry is 
necessary—not only into the publicized destruction of two video-
tapes, but with respect to the many other taped interrogations which 
either still exist or were destroyed. 
 
 
 46 Id. at 69–73, 176, 214. 
 47 See Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’ys of the Military 
Dep’ts, et al., at Enclosure (1), G(7) (July 14, 2006). 
 48 See 10 U.S.C. § 949(a)(Supp. III 2009).  
 49 See Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)). 
 50 This rule was not followed the first time around, however.  See Declaration of 
Lieutenant Stephen Abraham, Al Odah v. United States, 551 U.S. 1161 (2007), avail-
able at http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-
project/testimonies/testimonies-of-csrt-officers/testimony-of-stephen-
abraham/Al%20Odah%20reply%206-22-07.pdf (certifying that Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals did not review all evidence and that exculpatory evidence was with-
held). 
